COMMENTARIES
REGIME THEORY AND UNENUMERATED RIGHTS: A
CAUTIONARY NOTE

Barry Cushman*
The conference papers contributed by Professor Gillman and Professor Feldman are richly suggestive and provide much food for
thought. Each takes as his starting point the notion of 'jurisprudential regimes" in constitutional law, and seeks to illuminate the ways in
which such regimes are related to the political contexts in which they
operate. The ideas explored in each of these essays deserve a much
fuller consideration than I can hope to provide in this brief comment. I would like, however, to take a moment to consider some of
the issues of characterization and causal efficacy that each of these
scholars raises.
Professor Gillman argues that "It]he influence of regime politics
ensures that federal judges, especially at the top of the judicial hierarchy, will have concerns and preferences that are usually in sync with
other national power holders."' This synchronization of preferences
is "accomplished," according to Professor Gillman, "within a selfconsciously partisan appointment process," in which "party leaders in
the White House and Senate" seek nominees whose "decision-making
bias"-"the general political and ideological predispositions that they
bring to their institutional responsibilities"-will conform to those of
other members of the "national governing coalition."' Professor
Gillman claims not only that national governing coalitions attempt to
place on the CourtJustices who will promote their party's ideological
agenda, but that the history of unenumerated rights jurisprudence
demonstrates that they have been successful in doing so. It is this latter claim that most interests me, and it is this claim that I propose to
evaluate through a brief examination of 3the decisions of what Professor Gillman calls "the laissez-faire Court.
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If, in fact, the nomination and confirmation processes of the various national governing coalitions successfully accomplished their design to place sympathetic partners on the Court, one would expect to
see strong similarities among the voting patterns of Justices affiliated
with the same political party. One would also expect to see such similarities among Justices appointed by the same president, or perhaps
even among different presidents of the same party. In the area of
unenumerated rights, however, this does not appear to have been the
case. One might consider a number of hypotheses to explain this
phenomenon. It may be that in some instances the relevant ideological preferences and concerns of the national governing coalition find
expression at such a level of generality that they dictate no determinate answer to particular constitutional questions that come before
the Court. It may be that constitutional issues that will become salient during a Justice's tenure will not yet have appeared on the radar
screen of the national governing coalition at the time of the Justice's
nomination and confirmation. It may be that the members of the
national governing coalition are of more than one mind on particular constitutional issues. It may be that the ideological concerns and
preferences of the national governing coalition contain latent internal tensions that are exposed in the context of a particular constitutional setting, and necessitate a selection from among the coalition's
competing values and preferences. It may be that Justices of the Supreme Court are not subject to the conventions and mechanisms of
party discipline applicable to members of the legislative branch. It
may be thatJustices of the Supreme Court do not think of themselves
as members of a national governing coalition when they are engaged
in the enterprise of constitutional adjudication, or at least that they
do not think of themselves this way all of the time. This list is intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive-there may of course
be other explanations as well-and these explanations are not mutually exclusive, but may operate in some combination. But whatever
the explanation, the phenomenon to which I refer becomes readily
apparent from a brief sampling of the better-known unenumerated
rights decisions of the so-called "laissez-faire Court."
Consider first Professor Gillman's principal example of unenumerated rights jurisprudence on the "laissez-faire Court," Meyer v. Nebraska.5 Professor Gillman suggests that the decision in Meyer to invalidate a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of modern
foreign languages in grammar school, and elaborating in dicta a se4 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Lewis F. Powell Jr. and the Art ofJudicialSelection,
112 HARV. L.

REv. 597, 598 (1999) (noting thatJustice Powell was not asked a single question about abortion
or affirmative action at his confirmation hearing).
5 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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ries of unenumerated rights protected by the Due Process Clause, was
in keeping with the "libertarian" commitments of the Republican
party of the 1920s. 6 The vote in Meyer was 7-2. The opinion was writ-

ten by Justice McReynolds, a Democrat and an appointee of Woodrow Wilson. It was joined by the Republican Justice McKenna, a
McKinley appointee; Justice Van Devanter, a Republican and a Taft
appointee; Justice Brandeis, another Wilson appointee; Chief Justice
Taft and Justice Sanford, Republicans appointed by President Harding; and Justice Butler, a Democratic Harding appointment. In dissent were Justice Holmes, a Republican Roosevelt appointee, and the
Republican Justice Sutherland, a former Senator and a confidante of
Warren Harding, who had appointed Sutherland to the Court.7 One
would be hard-pressed to produce any account of the Republican
governing coalition that did not at the very least include both Taft
and Sutherland. How, then, are we to account for the divergence of
their votes? Should we conclude that Sutherland was flouting the
"libertarian" commitments of his party, or perhaps that he was embracing the nativist commitments it expressed in the Immigration Act
of 1924?8 Were Taft and Van Devanter embracing the party's "libertarian" preferences, or rejecting its nativist concerns?9 It would appear that a self-respecting Republican Justice could take either position and still be both "in sync"' 0 and, to some extent, out of sync, with
the concerns and preferences of the national governing coalition.
And where that is the case, one has to wonder whether the fact that
these Justices were Republicans, or that they were nominated and
confirmed by Republican political officials, can provide us with much
assistance in predicting or explaining their behavior on the bench.
Among the unenumerated rights listed by Justice McReynolds in
Meyer, of course, was "the right of the individual to contract."1 Consider, then, a "liberty of contract" decision handed down the same
year that Meyer was rendered, Adkins v. Children's Hospital12 Here the
vote was 5-3 to invalidate the District of Columbia's minimum wage
law for women, though Justice Brandeis almost certainly would have
Gillman, supra note 1, at 111.
FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 105-08,
112-14 (1951).
8 Id. at 218-19; see also MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE
MAKING
6

7 SeeJOEL

OF MODERN AMERICA 17-55 (2004).
9 For the present, I leave to one side the question of whether it is even
possible to generate

a persuasive account of the Taft Court's jurisprudence as "libertarian" in character. For a discussion of some of the challenges that such an effort would encounter, see, for example, Barry
Cushman, Lost Fidelities,41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 95, 100-02 (1999); Barry Cushman, The Secret
Lives of the FourHorsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559 (1997).
,0Gillman, supra note 1, at 108.
" Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
1
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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joined the dissenters had he not recused himself. The majority opinion was written by the Republican Sutherland, and was joined by Democrats McReynolds and Butler, as well as by Republicans McKenna
and Van Devanter. The dissenters were all Republicans: Holmes, the
Harding appointee Sanford, and Chief Justice Taft, who as President
had appointed Van Devanter. Party affiliation or sponsorship provide
virtually no predictive or explanatory power here, either.
The same might be said of the liberty of contract decisions more
generally. The majority opinion in Lochner v. New York,13 for example,
was written by the Democrat Rufus Peckham, a Cleveland appointee.
Peckham's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Fuller, another Democrat and Cleveland appointee; by Justice Brewer and Justice
Brown, both Republicans and Harrison appointees; and by Justice
McKenna, a Republican and a McKinley appointee. The dissenters
were the Republican Justice Harlan, a Hayes appointee; the Democrat Justice White, a Cleveland appointee; and the Republican Justices
Day and Holmes, each Roosevelt appointees. Similarly, a series of
liberty of contract cases decided by the Fuller Court saw the challenged statutes sustained by seven-man majorities comprised of both
Democrats and Republicans, with the Republican
Brewer repeatedly
4
joining the Democrat Peckham in dissent.
Consider next Adair v. United States,5 decided only three years after Lochner. Adair invalidated on liberty of contract grounds a provision of the 1898 Erdman Act prohibiting interstate common carriers
from discriminating against employees because of their union membership.1 6 The majority opinion was written by justice Harlan, and
was joined by fellow Republicans Brewer and Day (Moody did not
participate), and by Democrats Peckham and White. Republicans
Holmes and McKenna dissented. In Coppage v. Kansas,17 decided in
1915, the Court declared that the state's anti-yellow dog contract
statute unconstitutionally interfered with liberty of contract. There
the majority opinion was written by Republican Taft appointee Mahlon Pitney, and was joined by fellow Republicans Van Devanter and
McKenna, as well as by Democrats White and Joseph Lamar. This

13

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

14 See McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909) (upholding anti-coal screening statute); Otis

v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903) (upholding provision of California Constitution prohibiting purchase of corporate stock on margin or for future delivery); Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425 (1902)
(upholding state law prohibiting options trading in grain futures); Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v.
Barton, 183 U.S. 23 (1901) (upholding anti-scrip law); Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S.
13 (1901) (same); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding maximum hours law for
miners).
1 208 U.S. 161
(1908).
16 Id. at 168-69.
17

236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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time the dissenters were again Republicans-Holmes, Day, and
Hughes, a Taft appointee. Bunting v. Oregon,' which Chief Justice
Taft and many others viewed as overruling Lochner sub silentio in 1917,
upheld an Oregon maximum hours law applicable to workers in
mills, factories, and manufacturing establishments against the charge
that it unconstitutionally abridged freedom of contract. The opinion
was written by Republican Justice McKenna and joined by Republicans Holmes, Day, and Pitney, as well as by Democrat and Wilson appointee John Clarke. In dissent were the Republican Van Devanter
and the Democrats White and McReynolds.
In 1917, the Court also upheld workmen's compensation statutes
in the face of claims that they deprived employers of liberty of contract. The Court's opinion sustaining the New York statute in New
York CentralRailroad Co. v. White 9 was unanimous. That same year, in
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,20 the Washington statute was sustained by a sharply divided Court. In the majority were the Republican Pitney, the Republican Holmes, Wilson appointee Brandeis, the
Democrat Clarke, and the Republican Day; in dissent were the Democrat White, the Republican McKenna, the Republican Van Devanter, and the Democrat McReynolds. Wilson v. New, 2' also decided in
1917, upheld the Adamson Act's regulation of the wages of railway
employees over the objection that it deprived the railroads of their
rights to contract. The majority opinion was written by the Democrat
White, who dissented in Lochner, Bunting, and Mountain Timber, and
was joined by Brandeis, the Republican Holmes, and the Democrat
Clarke. The Republican Justice McKenna, who had dissented in
Adair,joined Coppage, written Bunting, dissented in Mountain Timber,
and would join Adkins, concurred in Wilson. In dissent now were the
Republican Van Devanter; the Democrat McReynolds; the Republican Day, who had dissented in Lochner,joined Adair, dissented in Coppage, joined Bunting and Mountain Timber (and would soon write
Hammer v. Dagenhar?2 ); and the Republican Pitney, who had written
Coppage and Mountain Timber, and joined Bunting.
In none of these cases would knowledge of the party affiliation of
the Justice or of the President who nominated him get us very far in
either predicting or explaining the voting pattern observed or the result obtained. It is only at the more granular level of individual intellectual biography that we can hope to shed greater light on this seem-

18 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
9 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
20

243 U.S. 219 (1917). One sees the same split in Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 400

(1919).
2 243 U.S. 332
(1917).
22

247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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ing crazy-quilt pattern of voting behavior.23 Professor Gillman argues
that "when we think about the Lochner era, it may be more useful to
think a little less about the specific jurisprudence and life histories of
the individual Justices and more about the attitudes of the postReconstruction Republican Party about how courts fit into their general agenda., 24 With respect to the unenumerated rights decisions of
the so-called "Lochner era," I would suggest that precisely the opposite
is the case.25

Professor Feldman is interested in the salient characteristics of the
political and constitutional regimes of "republican democracy" and
"pluralist democracy," and the manner in which the Supreme Court
adjust[ed] to the transition" from the former to the latter. In characterizing the constitutional regime of "republican democracy," Professor Feldman follows the lead of Professor Gillman 27 and, implicitly,
those whose work anticipated and paved the way for Professor Gillman's analysis of economic substantive due process. 28 That analysis
23

For my own effort to do so with respect to the crucial swing vote of Justice McKenna, see

Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 881, 926-41 (2005).
2 Howard Gillman, First Amendment Doctrine as Regime Politics, in 14 THE GOOD
SOCIETY 59
(2005). Professor Gillman has also explored his more general hypothesis concerning partisan
entrenchment in Howard Gillman, How PoliticalParties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511 (2002), and Howard
Gillman, The Waite Court, 1874-1888: The Collapse of Reconstruction and the Transition to Conservative Constitutionalism, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OFJUSTICE (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005).
2
The approach I suggest may strike Professor Gillman and others as "internalist" rather
than "externalist" in character. To the extent that Professor Gillman views the "'internal vs. external' debate" as "unnecessarily dichotomous," however, I believe that he misapprehends the
character of the debate. To my knowledge, no one does "doubt the influence of external political considerations on the broad contours of constitutional decision-making." Gillman, supra
note 1, at 115 n.40. The debate between internalists and externalists has not been over whether
law and politics are causally related, but instead over how they are causally related in particular
instances. For an instructive overview of the issues, see G. Edward White, ConstitutionalChange
and the New Deal: The Internalist/ExternalistDebate, 110 AM. HIST. REv. 1094 (2005).
Stephen M. Feldman, Unenumerated Rights in Different DemocraticRegimes, 9 U. PA.J. CONST.
L. 47,58 (2006).
27HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESEIGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF Lochner ERA
POLICE POWERSJURISPRUDENCE (1993).
28 See generally OWEN M. FISS, 8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES:
TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 156, 160 (1993) (examining the

Court's efforts to limit legislative redistribution through the requirement that laws be "universal" or "neutral" in their application); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991) (surveying the development of labor law, especially the
judiciary's role in shaping the strategies of the labor movement); MORTONJ. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:

THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 19-31

(1992) (exploring the evolution of the "neutral state" by looking at the development of the
power of taxation and the police power); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faireand Liberty: A Re-
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holds that a central feature of economic substantive due process was
its insistence that government not enact "special," "partial," "unequal," or "class" legislation, "legislation that could not be considered
as public-regarding because it benefited certain interest groups or
took from A to30give to B.",2 9 While I agree with this assessment as a
general matter, I find that Professor Feldman draws from it particular inferences that strike me as difficult to defend. For example, Professor Feldman argues that, before the decisions in the Labor Board
Cases of 1937, "the Court had consistently deemed any statute that
benefited unions to be impermissible class legislation furthering a
partial or private interest rather than the common good."3 ' How, one
wonders, are we to reconcile this claim with the Court's unanimous
1930 decision upholding the Railway Labor Act's provisions protecting the right of employees to select representatives "without interference, influence, or coercion exercised" by their employers? 2 Moreover, if, as Professor Feldman contends, the Four Horsemen
remained unreconstructed adherents to such a principle of "republican democracy, 33 how do we account for their unanimous support
Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REv. 293,
298, 304-31 (1985) (arguing that laissez-faire constitutionalism was part of "a long heritage of
protection for liberty" and that it was partially based on the classical understanding of the laws
of economics); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded
Age, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 767 (1985) (examining the struggle in the post-Civil War era over which
interpretation of free labor would prevail); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence
of Government-Business Relations: Some Parametersof Laissez-FaireConstitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61J.
AM. HIST. 970 (1975) (charting Justice Field's efforts to distinguish between regulation and confiscation in cases dealing with the scope of the police power); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding
the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L.
REV. 187, 189-92 (1984) (noting the importance of the property-privilege distinction in Lochner
era cases); Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United
States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REv. 249, 278 (1987) (discussing the relationship
between paternalism and redistribution in laissez-faire constitutionalism); Cass R. Sunstein,
Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 878-89 (1987) (noting the Court's concern during
the Lochner era that class legislation was selfish, partisan, interest group legislation).
29 David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 12-13 (2003)
(citing
GILLMAN, supra note 27, at 10, 46, 127).
30 See generally Cushman, supra note 23. As I make clear in that piece, however, I do not believe that what Professor Gillman calls the "principle of neutrality" can offer a complete positive
account of the content of economic substantive due process. Nor do I share Professor Gillman's interesting view that constitutional liberty was simply "the residuum of a government of
limited powers." Howard Gillman, Reconnecting the Moder Court to the HistoricalEvolution of Capitalism, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS
235, 249 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999). I find more persuasive the view that
ideas about rights helped to shape conceptions of the scope of legitimate government power.
See, e.g., Charles W. McCurdy, The 'Liberty of Contract' Regime in American Law, in THE STATE AND
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998).
31 Feldman, supra note 26, at 73.
32 Tex. & New Orleans R.R. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 558 (1930). Justice
McReynolds did not participate.
33 Feldman, supra note 26, at 50.
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for the 1934 amendments to the Act, requiring carriers to engage in
collective bargaining exclusively with the representatives designated
by their employees? 4 Similarly, why, if Professor Feldman is correct,
did each of the Horsemen join the 1937 opinion upholding application of the National Labor Relations Act to a company providing interstate bus service? 35 If, as some have suggested, maximum hours
statutes worked to benefit unionized employees by reducing competition from their non-unionized counterparts,36 how can we reconcile
Professor Feldman's claim with the Court's decision upholding Oregon's maximum hours law in Bunting v. Oregon, or with other decisions upholding statutes regulating working hours?37 "Meanwhile,"
Professor Feldman maintains, "courts had consistently concluded that
statutes promoting business or commerce promoted the common
good. 38 Professor Feldman does not cite particular examples of such
instances, but one wonders how this description might be reconciled
with, for example, cases in which courts of the period held that state
or local governments had exceeded their constitutional authority by

S4Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
35 Wash., Va., & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
Their liberty of contract dissent in the manufacturing cases, by contrast, can be found in the dissent to NLRB v. FriedmanHarry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 101-03 (1937). For my explanation of this pattern, to
which the division of opinion in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), is central, see BARRY
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 136-38 (1998).
36 See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
113-21 (1980)

(arguing that the New York law in Lochner probably operated to marginalize immigrant workers
in small, non-unionized bakeries); Bernstein, supra note 29, at 23-24 (suggesting that the bake
shop law in Lochner "was arguably special interest legislation that benefited established, unionized German-American bakers at the expense of more recent immigrants."); David E. Bernstein,
Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1, 50 n.264 (2003) (maintaining that Lochner's supporters took the view "that the law was a sop to the bakers' union, which illegitimately sought to
monopolize the labor market for bakers by forcing all bakeries to abide by union work rules.");
Sidney G. Tarrow, Lochner v. New York: A Political Analysis, 5 LAB. HIST. 277, 287-90 (1964)
(describing the origins of the statute in the journeyman bakers' union movement); Editorial, A
Check to Union Tyranny, THE NATION, May 4, 1905, at 346-47 (viewing maximum-hour legislation
as attempts by unions to "delimit the competition of non-unionists"); Editorial, Fussy Legislation,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1905, at 10 (suggesting that maximum-hour legislation was passed in response to the demands of labor leaders).
a7See, e.g., United States v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 249 U.S. 296 (1919) (holding terminal subject to federal Hours of Service Act); Chi. & Alton R.R. v. United States, 247 U.S. 197
(1918) (affirming a penalty for violation of the federal Hours of Service Act); Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 244 U.S. 336 (1917) (same); Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332
(1917) (upholding maximum hours law for railway workers); Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. of Tex.
v. United States, 231 U.S. 112 (1913) (affirming a penalty imposed for violation of federal
Hours of Service Act); Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 221 U.S. 612 (1911)
(upholding the federal Hours of Service Act); Cantwell v. Missouri, 199 U.S. 602 (1905) (per
curiam) (upholding maximum hours law for miners); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898)
(same).
Feldman, supra note 26, at 73.
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subsidizing "private" enterprises with public funds.3 9
Professor
Feldman's generalizations, offered categorically as accurate descriptions of pre-1937 jurisprudence, simply cannot capture the complex
texture of the period's constitutional law. Nor, for that matter, can
Professor Feldman's conventional use of the political labels "conservative," "progressive-liberal," and "centrist" to describe the Justices °
convey much more than a rather vague and too often misleading impression of their positions on particular constitutional issues.41
See, e.g., Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885) (invalidating bonds issued to finance private
iron and steel manufacturing enterprise); Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487 (1883) (invalidating the issuance of municipal bonds to finance private manufacturing enterprises); Loan Ass'n
v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874) (invalidating issuance of municipal bonds to attract
and finance the construction by a private company of a factory to manufacture iron bridges);
Dodge v. Mission Twp., 107 F. 827 (8th Cir. 1901) (invalidating statute authorizing townships
and cities to subscribe for stock in and to issue bonds to support private sugar factories); English v. People, 96 Ill. 566 (1880) (invalidating tax to support private manufacturing company);
Bissell v. City of Kankakee, 64 Ill. 249 (1872) (invalidating bonds issued to finance private
manufacturer of linen fabrics); Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28 (1869) (invalidating tax subsidies
to support railroad construction); Central Branch Union Pac. R.R. v. Smith, 23 Kan. 745 (1880)
(invalidating bonds issued to finance private manufacturing company); Griffith v. Osawkee
Twp., 14 Kan. 418 (1875) (holding that bonds issued to help farmers purchase seed and grain
were not for a public purpose); Commercial Nat'l Bank of Cleveland v. City of Iola, 9 Kan. 689
(1873) (holding that issuance of municipal bonds to aid in construction of a factory was not for
a public purpose); Allen v. Inhabitants ofJay, 60 Me. 127 (1871) (holding that construction of a
box factory is not a public purpose, and therefore could not be supported by public finance);
Lowell v. City of Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (1873) (holding statute authorizing issuance of municipal bonds to finance loans to landowners whose property had been destroyed by fire to be an
invalid authorization of taxation for a private purpose); Michigan Sugar Co. v. Auditor Gen.,
124 Mich. 674 (1900) (invalidating statute authorizing payment of bounties to manufacturers of
sugar from beets grown in the state as authorizing taxation for a private purpose); Detroit &
Howell R.R. Co. v. Salem Twp. Bd., 20 Mich. 452 (1870) (holding that taxation to aid in the
construction of a railroad was not for a public purpose); William Deering & Co. v. Petersen, 75
Minn. 118 (1898) (invalidating statute appropriating funds to be loaned to farmers for the private purpose of buying seed grain); Deal v. Mississippi County, 107 Mo. 464 (1891) (invalidating
statute providing for the payment of bounties to persons planting and cultivating private prairie
land with forest trees); Weimer v. Village of Douglas, 64 N.Y. 91 (1880) (invalidating bonds issued to finance private manufacturing corporation); Whiting v. Sheboygan & Fond du Lac R.R.,
25 Wis. 167 (1870) (invalidating tax subsidies to support railroad construction).
40 Feldman, supranote 26, at 63.
41 For a litany of instances in which one or more of the Four Horsemen voted contrary
to
type, see Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, supra note 9, passim. For instances in
which justice Holmes and/orJustice Brandeis voted to invalidate economic regulation, see, for
example, Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils., 300 U.S. 55 (1937) (Brandeis); Treigle v. Acme
Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936) (Brandeis); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295 U.S. 555 (1935) (Brandeis); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935)
(Brandeis); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (Brandeis); Smith v. Cahoon,
283 U.S. 553 (1931) (Holmes and Brandeis); W. & Ad. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929)
(Holmes and Brandeis); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929) (Holmes and Brandeis); Williams
v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (Brandeis, concurring in the result); Washington v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (Holmes and Brandeis); Standard Pipe Line Co. v. Miller County
Highway & Bridge Dist., 277 U.S. 160 (1928) (Holmes and Brandeis); Road Improvement Dist.
v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 274 U.S. 188 (1927) (Holmes and Brandeis);Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271
U.S. 500 (1926) (Holmes and Brandeis); Mich. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925)
39
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It seems that Professor Feldman's monolithic characterization of
the period's constitutional law leads him to overstate the doctrinal
discontinuities of the New Deal era not only with respect to the constitutional law of collective bargaining, but with respect to the issue of
unemployment compensation as well. Before the Court upheld provisions of the Social Security Act providing for unemployment benefits
in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,42 Professor Feldman contends, "the
Justices likely would have held that a provision benefiting the unemployed amounted to class legislation favoring only partial or private
interests. ,43 I am not certain what leads Professor Feldman to believe
this. The Supreme Court, and courts generally, had consistently held
that the relief of poverty was a public purpose on which public funds
could be spent. 4 Steward Machine did not actually concern objections
that unemployment compensation was by its nature class legislation
or unconstitutionally redistributive, but instead addressed principally
federalism objections to the federal portions of the program of cooperative federalism. The class legislation objections were considered
instead in cases challenging the constitutionality of conforming state
programs of unemployment compensation. The New York statute
was upheld in W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews on November 23,
1936, approximately ten weeks before the unveiling of the Courtpacking plan to which Professor Feldman attributes so much causal
weight. 5 The Alabama statute was upheld by a vote of 5-4 on May 24,
1937, in Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.46 Here, however, the
vote count is deceptive.
Dissenting separately from Justice

(Holmes and Brandeis); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v.Ct. of Indus. Relations of Kan., 267 U.S.
552 (1925) (Holmes and Brandeis); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924) (Holmes and
Brandeis); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Ct. of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923) (Holmes
and Brandeis); St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922) (Holmes and
Brandeis); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of La., 251 U.S. 396 (1920) (Holmes and
Brandeis); Terminal Taxi Cab Co. v. Kutz, Newman, & Brownlow, 241 U.S. 252 (1916)
(Holmes); Myles Salt Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Iberia & St. Mary Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 478
(1916) (Holmes); San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 233
U.S. 454 (1914) (Holmes); Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914)
(Holmes); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) (Holmes); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska,
217 U.S. 196 (1910) (Holmes); and Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Cent. Stock Yards Co., 212
U.S. 132 (1909) (Holmes).
42 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
4 Feldman, supra note 26,
at 74 n.186.
SeeKelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78, 81 (1881) ("[T]he support of the poor ....
[is a] public
purpose[] in which the whole community ha[s] an interest, and for which, by common consent,
property owners everywhere in this country are taxed."); Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 42-44 (1986) (noting the "unbroken consensus of American constitutional history in favor of public duties to the poor").
299 U.S. 515 (1936) (per curiam). The decision affirmed a decision of the New York
Court of Appeals by an equally divided Court, with the seriously ill and therefore absentJustice
Stone not participating.
46 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
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McReynolds, Justices Sutherland, Van Devanter, and Butler did detail
the ways in which the Alabama statute transgressed limitations imposed by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. But they
also offered what amounted to an advisory opinion that the Wisconsin •unemployment
compensation law, enacted in 1931, was constitu41
tional. It was eminently possible, they said in effect, to accommodate a scheme of unemployment compensation within the
constitutional regime of "republican democracy."
Similarly, Professor Feldman regards the Court's decision in West
48 upholding Washington's minimum
Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
wage law
for women, as a significant departure in constitutional law that signaled the end of the constitutional regime of "republican democracy." In this I believe he is mistaken. First, as I will argue in more
detail below, I believe that this assessment is inconsistent with the voting behavior of Hughes and Roberts in subsequent cases involving
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment limitations on economic regulation. Second, as Professor Feldman himself recognizes, Hughes took
pains throughout his opinion in West Coast Hotel to show how the
minimum wage could be reconciled with a jurisprudence committed
to state neutrality.49 And in this view Hughes and his colleagues in
the majority were hardly alone. Chief Justice Taft, Justice Sanford,
and Justice Holmes had taken the same position in Adkins in 1923,
and Justice Brandeis would have joined them had he not recused
himself. Four of the Justices had taken that position when Stettler v.
O'Hara0 was affirmed by an equally divided Court in 1917; had Justice
Brandeis not recused himself, there would have been five votes to
uphold the minimum wage as early as 1917. After Justice Stone replaced Justice McKenna in 1925, there were presumably five members of the Taft Court who believed that Adkins had been wrongly decided, notwithstanding two per curiam decisions in which the Court
invalidated minimum wage statutes on the authority of the Adkins
precedent.5 There were thus a number of junctures during the con47 Id. at 527-31.

300 U.S. 379 (1937).
49 For a detailed analysis of Hughes' opinion in this regard, see CUSHMAN, supra
note 35, at

85-92.
50 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (per curiam).
51 See Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927) (per curiam)
(Taft, Holmes,

Sanford, and Stone concurring silently in decision invalidating Arkansas minimum wage statute,
with Justice Brandeis as the lone dissenter); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925) (per curiam) (Taft, Sanford, and Stone concurring silently in decision invalidating Arizona minimum
wage statute, with Brandeis dissenting and Holmes concurring on the ground that he considered himself bound by the authority of Adkins). Similarly, there were probably five members of
the Hughes Court who consistently believed that Adkins had been wrongly decided, notwithstanding the decision in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). See CUSHMAN,
supra note 35, at 92-104; Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 313-14
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stitutional regime of "republican democracy" at which a decision upholding the minimum wage might have been rendered, despite the
fact that Justices supporting such a decision were strongly committed
to the existence of various Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment constraints on governmental power to regulate the economy. No revolutionary understandinF of "'the public interest', 2 was a prerequisite to
such a development.'
Because Professor Feldman regards these decisions as constituting
such significant departures that they herald the birth of a new constitutional regime, he seeks some causal explanation for their emergence. He goes looking in the usual places-popular opinion, the
1936 election, and President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. Elsewhere I have detailed at length reasons for doubting the causal efficacy of each of these, so I will here confine myself to a few brief observations. First, Professor Feldman contends that popular reaction
to the Court's decisions demonstrated to the Justices "that their politics contravened the desires of a vast American majority. "54 For example, he points out that a group of students at Iowa State University
responded to the Butlerdecision by hanging the six Justices of the majority in effigy.5 5 While the Justices may have found this event dis-

tasteful, they may also have thought that a contemporaneous Gallup
poll showing 59% of respondents opposed the Agricultural Adjustment Act was more reflective of public opinion.56 The polls similarly
help to shed light on the meaning of the results of the 1936 election.
A glance at those election results might lead one to believe that the
American people wholeheartedly endorsed every aspect of the Roosevelt program, and were therefore annoyed by Court decisions declaring portions of that program unconstitutional.5 7 Yet when one examines the polls on an issue-by-issue, program-by-program basis, a far
more complex picture emerges. While there was strong support for
constitutionally unproblematic programs of federal spending to alle-

(1955) (noting that Justice Roberts was prepared to overrule Adkins, but "silently agreed with
the Court" because "a majority could not be had for overruling it.").
52 Feldman, supra note 26, at 72.
53 However, a wide variety of contemporary commentators believed that the revolutionary
understanding of the concept of "businesses affected with a public interest" set out in justice
Roberts' opinion in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531 (1934) made the demise of Adkinsvirtually inevitable. See Cushman, Lost Fidelities,supra note 9, at 121-23 & n.129 (noting the widespread speculation of legal commentators that Adkins would be overruled).
54 Feldman, supra note 26, at 69.
55 Id. at 68.
1 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 9 (1972). The

poll was reported in the Washington Post the day before the Butler opinion was released. See
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 5, 1936, at B4.
57 For reasons to doubt that the election results influenced the Court's
disposition of cases
in early 1937, see CUSHMAN, supranote 35, at 25-32.
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viate conditions of poverty," for example, the support of the American people for the expansion of federal regulatory power in general
was at best tepid and highly variable.
Meanwhile, polls taken between 1935 and 1937 showed both popular support for the Court and
consistent opposition to proposals to clip its wings. Between February
and May of 1937, Gallup published six polls asking respondents
whether they favored congressional enactment of Roosevelt's proposal to reorganize the Supreme Court. In none of those polls did a
majority support the Court-packing plan.6"
Despite the significant obstacles that the President's proposal
faced both in popular opinion and in Congress,6' Professor Feldman
believes that it played a significant role in influencing the Court's decisions in 1937. Particularly curious is his view that the Court-packing
plan influenced Justice Roberts' vote in West Coast Hotel. Professor
Feldman recognizes that Roberts cast his vote before the public announcement of the plan, but discounts the importance of this chronology because "administration leaks had created a buzz in Washington by the end of January 1937: Roosevelt was preparing a major
announcement about the Court. 62 It has long been recognized that
Justice Roberts cast his vote in West Coast Hotel at the conference held
December 19, 1936.63 It is difficult to understand how a buzz created
by the end of January of 1937 could have influenced a vote cast in
mid-December of 1936. Of course, there had been talk of packing
the Court long before January of 1937. Rumors of such a presidential
plan had circulated as early as January of 1934. As the Literary Digest
reported, "In the intimate circle the idea of reconstituting the Supreme Court has been considered.... In the conversation within the
Roosevelt circle, a court of fifteen, instead of the present nine, has
been mentioned." 64 Indeed, more than one hundred bills to restrict
federal judicial power were introduced in Congress during 1935 and
in early 1936.65 Some would have increased the size of the Court;
some would have required a super-majority of the Justices or a
unanimous Court to invalidate federal legislation; some would have

58 See Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional Change in

the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 48-60, 64-66 (2002) (noting the results of numerous polls showing support for federal relief programs).
59 Id. at 33-39, 60-62.
60 Id. at 67-68.
61 See generally CUSHMAN, supra note 35, at 13-25.
62 Feldman, supra note 26, at 76-77.
63 Frankfurter, supra note 51, at 314-15; MERLO J. PUsEY, 2
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 757
(1951).
LITERARY DIGEST, Jan. 20, 1934, at 10, quoted inWILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE
SUPREME
COURT REBORN: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 85 (1995).
6 ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW
426

(1956).
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stripped the Court of the power of judicial review altogether. 66 Yet

throughout 1935 and 1936, the Court invalidated a slew of state and
federal regulatory statutes, seemingly uninfluenced by mounting
congressional and presidential criticism.

In the face of these political pressures, Professor Feldman argues,
the "dominant elites retreated in 1937," and "economic regulation
became subject to mere rational basis review" of the sort sketched in
Carolene Products.68 "[J]udicial deference to economic and social welfare statutes," Professor Feldman concludes, was "the quintessence of
the Court's 1937 switch." 69 Professor Feldman's argument is thus a
reprise of the conventional narrative, in which Roberts and, to a
lesser extent, perhaps, Hughes, abandoned their earlier positions
concerning Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment limitations on government's power to impose economic regulation and acquiesced in
the birth of a new constitutional regime.
One of the challenges confronting this view is that it is very difficult to reconcile with the subsequent behavior of Hughes and Roberts in cases raising such issues under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. To be sure, they cast the decisive votes in West Coast
Hotel. But those votes hardly signaled their rejection of constitutional
constraints on economic regulation, nor their embrace of what Professor Feldman characterizes as "pluralist democracy." The Justices
simply agreed, as had several of their predecessors during the regime
of "republican democracy," that Washington's minimum wage law for
women satisfied the requirements of due process. For even after the
decision in West Coast Hotel, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts
continued to demand that federal and state economic regulation
comply with precisely the sorts of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
limitations on which they had insisted in 1935 and 1936.

See RONALD L. FEINMAN, TWILIGHT OF PROGRESSIVISM 121 (1981)

(describing Progressive

proposals to require a unanimous decision or a 7-2 decision before the Court could rule legislation unconstitutional); WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY 295-98 (1994) (describing proposals

for limiting the Court's power over economic legislation).

See generally William E. Leuchten-

burg, The Origins ofFranklinD. Roosevelt's 'Court-Packing'Plan,1966 SuP. CT. REV. 347 (1966).
67 See, e.g., Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936)
(invalidating New York minimum wage

law for women); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating the Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act of 1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555
(1935) (invalidating the Frazier-Lemke Act of 1934); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating Live Poultry Code of the National Industrial Recovery
Act); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating Railroad Retirement Act of

1934); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating provisions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act pertaining to the regulation of "hot" oil).
68 Feldman, supra note 26, at 87.
69

Id. at 82.
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Consider just a few examples. First, on May 24, 1937-nearly two
months after the announcement of the decision in West Coast HotelChief Justice Hughes joined the Four Horsemen in a 5-4 decision invalidating on equal protection grounds a Georgia regulation that
treated stock insurance companies less favorably than mutuals. 70 It is

not readily apparent how this decision can be reconciled with a
commitment to "pluralist democracy." Second, in 1939, Hughes and
Roberts dissented from an opinion upholding a federal scheme of
milk price regulation in the Boston and New York metropolitan areas. 7 ' The dissenting Justices contended that the regulation in question discriminated in favor of larger distributors and against their
smaller competitors, thereby denying the latter due process. 7' Their
dissent echoed the position they had taken three years earlier in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck," where they had joined the majority
opinion invalidating a comparable New York milk price regulation
that favored dealers who had entered the market earlier over their
newer competitors. Again, it is not clear how this position manifests a
devotion to "pluralist democracy."
Third, in 1940, Roberts dissented from an opinion upholding a
Kentucky statute giving more favorable tax treatment to deposits in
Kentucky banks than to those in out-of-state banks. In the 1935 case
of Colgate v. Harvey,7 5 Roberts had joined the majority opinion invalidating a comparable Vermont tax statute that treated interest income
from money loaned outside the state less favorably than such income
from in-state loans. The Colgate majority had held that the statute violated the Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and Roberts believed that the same was
true of the Kentucky statute upheld in 1940.76 He therefore dissented
when Colgate was overruled in 1940. 7 Fourth, later in 1940, Hughes
and Roberts stood by a unanimous decision of the Court rendered on
February 1, 1937-and authored by Justice Brandeis-which invalidated a proration order of the Texas Railroad Commission on the
ground that it deprived certain gas producers of their property without due process, advantaging some gas producers at the expense of
others. 8 In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan and Nichols Oil Co.,79
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937).
United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
72 Id. at 583-87.
73 297 U.S. 266 (1936).
74 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1940).
70
71

75 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
76

Madden, 309 U.S. at 93-94.

77

Id.

78 Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
79 310 U.S. 573 (1940).
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Hughes and Roberts maintained that another proration order of the
Commission similarly violated the Due Process Clause-but this time
they did so in dissent.8 ° One can understand how the positions of the
majority in these cases might be characterized as informed by a
commitment to the tenets of "pluralist democracy." But again, one
searches for an explanation reconciling the dissenting positions of
Hughes and Roberts with such tenets.
One could continue to elaborate upon these and other examples,
but as I have done so in detail elsewhere, I will not belabor the point
here."' Suffice it to say that during and after 1937, and indeed
throughout the remainders of their judicial careers, Hughes and
Roberts continued to adhere to the positions on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment limits on economic regulation that they had articulated earlier in the 1930s. After President Roosevelt had replaced
the retiring Justices Van Devanter and Sutherland with Justices Black
and Reed by early 1938, there would be a solid majority of Justices
embracing positions on issues of economic regulation more deferential than those subscribed to by Hughes and Roberts. The collective
position of the Court shifted on these issues not because of changes
in the minds of its incumbent Justices, but because of changes in the
institution's judicial personnel. The appointments process was not
simply the mechanism through which the shift from one constitutional "regime" to another was "solidif[ied] .82 It was the mechanism

through which this particular jurisprudential transformation was
achieved.a

80 Id. at 585.

81 See Cushman, supra note 23, at 982-98 (discussing, inter alia, United States v. Willow River
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 511-15 (1945); United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386,
393 (1945); Charleston Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 192-93 (1945); United
States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939); and United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938)). Professor Feldman offers a version of the conventional reading of Carolene Products,
which does not address the qualifications to the deferential standard made explicit in Justice
Stone's opinion, nor the various meanings attached to the concept of rational basis review by
the participating Justices. See Cushman, supra note 23, at 992-97 for a survey of the views of the
Justices toward standards of review for economic legislation.
82 Feldman, supra note 26, at 77.
83 Indeed, the appointments of Hughes and Roberts
by President Hoover were themselves
critical factors in some of the constitutional transformations of the Depression Decade. See
CUSHMAN, supranote 35, at 225. As Max Planck wrote of developments in scientific thought, "a
new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the
light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is
familiar with it." MAX PLANCK, SCIENTIFIC AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER PAPERS 33-34 (F.
Gaynor trans., 1949).
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In the very interesting contributions of these two practitioners of
political science, one detects a common impulse to describe the constitutional landscape and the mechanisms by which it is transformed
from a considerable altitude, at a rather capacious level of generality.
Yet the closer one moves to the ground, the less descriptive power
these generalities appear to possess. One infers that Professor Gillman and Professor Feldman believe that characterization at the levels
of generality they have selected provides us with something the value
of which exceeds that which is sacrificed in terms of particularity,
contingency, nuance, and, in some instances, descriptive accuracy. I
am not confident that I have been able to form a clear idea of what
exactly that something is, and I am left wondering whether constitutional historians generally might regard the eager embrace of this
trade-off with some puzzlement.

